We propose a theoretical explanation for the so-called "beauty premium". Our explanation is based entirely on search frictions and the fact that physical appearance plays an important role in attracting a marriage partner. We analyse the interaction between frictional labour and marriage markets and establish the existence of a search equilibrium characterised by male wage di¤erentials. The equilibrium may also display the "marriage premium", predicted to be lower among attractive men. The link between beauty premium and marriage premium provides a falsi…cation test of the model. We carry out the empirical analysis and conclude that we cannot refute the theory.
Introduction
There is widespread evidence that labour market outcomes are in ‡uenced by more than just productivity. More speci…cally, anthropometric characteristics such as beauty, height and -to some extent -weight seem to have an e¤ect on employment outcomes in general, and wages in particular. Individuals perceived as having attractive physical attributes tend to earn higher wages. This earnings gap is called "beauty premium" in the literature, and has recently been the subject of extensive research, most of it empirical. 1 In a pioneering study, Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) found that individuals with below-average attractiveness earned 9% less than the "averagelooking" ones, whereas the wage of individuals with above-average looks was 5% higher. Their results were obtained after controlling for educational attainment and experience. Persico et al.(2004) attempted to quantify the so-called height premium and found that increasing height at age 16 by one inch increased adult wages by 2.6%, on average. In two fairly recent studies using UK data, Case and Paxson (2008) and Case at al.(2009) found that the height premium remains signi…cant after controlling for education and for sorting into higher status jobs. On the other hand, the e¤ect of weight on labour market outcomes seems to be less clear. Garcia and QuintanaDomeque (2007), Cawley (2004) and Han et al. (2009) …nd a wage penalty coupled with reduced employment probability for obese. In contrast, Hamermesh and Biddle (1994), Sargent and Blanch ‡ower (1994) and Morris (2006) argue that weight has no e¤ect on male earnings. Physical attributes (beauty, weight and height) are also known to play an important role in the marriage market. Extensive empirical results from sociology, anthropology, psychology and other …elds con…rm this fact. Following the path-breaking work of Becker (1991) on marriage markets, there is also an extensive economics literature that investigates assortative mating. Some studies, such as Choo and Siow (2006) and Weiss and Willis (1997) focus on matching based on age, earnings and education. Others consider the e¤ect of various anthropometric characteristics on marital outcomes. For height, Ore¢ ce and Quintana-Domeque (2010) …nd that shorter men are more likely to be matched with less educated heavier partners, while Ponzo and Scoppa 1 For a stimulating survey, see Hamermesh (2011).
2
(2014) conclude that taller males tend to marry more educated women. Manfredini et al. (2013) …nd a negative selection of short men on marriage, while Herpin (2005) …nds that short men are less likely to be married or live in a permanent relationship than their taller counterparts. For weight, Ore¢ ce and Quintana-Domeque (2010) …nd that heavier husbands are matched with shorter wives, while Silventoinen et al. (2003) observe assortative matching along weight (as well as height). Finally, Averett et al. (2008) conclude that spouses tend to pay less attention to their body-mass index (BMI) once they get married.
In this paper we propose a theoretical explanation for the existence of male beauty premium as an equilibrium outcome in a model that incorporates search frictions (uncertainty in the matching process) as well as multidimensional preferences that re ‡ect an implicit trade-o¤ between anthropometric and socio-economic characteristics. The key insight is that labour market decisions and outcomes may be in ‡uenced by expectations and behaviour in the marriage market.
To capture this inter-dependence, we construct a simple equilibrium search model where the two frictional markets are inter-linked. 2 Single men are heterogeneous in terms of their physical appearance: in the eyes of all women, some men are more attractive than others. We look at two-sided search where men and women look for each other, and unemployed men also search for jobs knowing that earnings (together with looks) determine whether or not they can form marriage partnerships. Crucially, although physical appearance does not a¤ect mens'options in the labour market, it a¤ects their decisions in that market, as their marriage prospects are in ‡uenced both by looks and wages.
Assuming that women regard physical characteristics and wages as substitutes and rank men in the same way, we show that there exists an equilibrium in which less attractive men …nd it optimal to accept jobs that pay lower wages than the wages of their more attractive rivals. The trade-o¤ is straightforward and comes from the frictional nature of the labour market: although a less attractive man needs a high wage in order to attract a woman, such a well-paid job might just be too di¢ cult to …nd, so he settles for a lower wage. As a consequence, more attractive men (single or married) will earn on average higher wages than less attractive (single or married) men.
Interestingly, the strategies that give rise to the beauty premium can also account for the so-called "marriage premium" -the phenomenon whereby married men earn higher wages than their single rivals. Empirical studies …nd (after controlling for education and other characteristics) that this premium is consistently around 10% or above. In contrast, marital wage di¤erentials are considerably smaller for women, and their sign varies. For excellent surveys of the empirical literature on male marriage wage premium, see Daniel (1995) and Grossbard-Shechtman and Neuman (2003).
We establish a delicate theoretical link between beauty premium and marriage premium. We show that a positive beauty premium is only consistent with a situation where the marriage premium of less attractive men is positive and higher than that of the more attractive ones. On the other hand, a zero beauty premium requires a zero marriage premium for attractive men coupled with a positive marriage premium for the less attractive ones.
The relationship between the two types of premia provides a straightforward test of the theoretical predictions of the model. In the empirical section of our paper we explore the existence of beauty premium and marriage premium across male workers who di¤er in terms of anthropometric characteristics. Following the empirical literature, we use height and weight as proxies for physical attractiveness. We carry out a falsi…cation test of our theory and conclude that the empirical results do not invalidate the model and therefore its predictions are relevant for the study of beauty premium and marriage premium.
Our contribution relates to the existing literature in two other important ways.
First, the focus is on male beauty premium (rather than assortative matching) and we consider one-sided heterogeneity (recall that women are homogeneous). Nonetheless, our approach incorporates some aspects of the marriage market whose importance was stressed by Chiappori et al. (2012) in the context of assortative matching. They argue that the standard theoretical marriage matching framework is too narrow: it overlooks the role played by uncertainty, and it restricts attention to one-dimensional matching processes. That is, it ignores richer patterns where partners may consider multiple characteristics, which in turn would allow for potential trade-o¤s between anthropometric features and socio-economic characteristics. 3 Our model captures the random nature of matching in frictional markets and also considers preferences over multi-dimensional characteristics, with our results being driven by the existence of search frictions and the perceived trade-o¤ between physical attributes and wages.
Second, throughout our theoretical analysis, the focus is on the reservation wage decisions of male workers. This allows us to ignore the wage policies of …rms and issues related to possible discrimination based on looks. Crucially, productivity heterogeneity plays no role whatsoever in establishing our results. This is in stark contrast with existing explanations of beauty premium and marriage premium, all of which rely on some sort of productivity di¤erences.
More speci…cally, the literature on beauty premium is based on the idea that some physical traits might a¤ect job performance in ways that are not as easily measured as other factors (such as human capital or work experience). One argument is that physical attractiveness may a¤ect a person's self-esteem or communication skills, and hence their productivity. Cawley (2004) …nds that productivity is negatively correlated with weight, possibly because of factors such as health or con…dence. Persico et al. (2004) suggest that height increases the probability that teens participate in social activities, and in turn these activities help them acquire productivity-enhancing skills. However, in contrast with these results, Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) found that the beauty premium exists even outside of jobs that involve frequent inter-personal contact and communication.
Similarly, almost all explanations of marriage premium rely on some sort of male productivity heterogeneity. According to the so-called selection theory, some unobservable traits of men which are valued in the marriage market are correlated with productivity. However, the empirical evidence on this is quite weak -for example, Chun and Lee (2001) argue that the selection e¤ect is minimal. Alternatively, household specialisation models postulate that marriage increases a man's productivity. Korenman and Neumark (1991) provide some limited empirical support for this hypothesis. However, Loh (1996) …nds that men whose wives also work earn a larger premium, while Hersch and Stratton (2000) conclude that the marriage premium is not due to household specialisation even if one doesn't use wives'employment status as proxy for specialisation. Blackburn and Korenman (1994) assess the relative merits of the two theories and …nd that the evidence is mixed: overall, neither selection nor specialisation are su¢ cient explanations for the existence of the male marriage wage gap. In this context, the only theoretical paper we are aware of that o¤ers a di¤erent explanation for the existence of marriage premium is Bonilla and Kiraly (2013) , who show that the marital earnings gap can arise simply as a result of search frictions.
The present paper is structured as follows. First, we set up our theoretical model. Next, we analyse the optimal search strategies of men and women. Section 4 looks at the search equilibrium characterised by beauty premium and marriage premium, and contains the main theoretical results. Section 5 carries out an empirical falsi…cation test of the model. The …nal section concludes.
The model
The economy consists of women and men, all risk neutral. Assume a continuum of men (normalised to 1), and a measure n of single women. Time is continuous and all agents discount the future at rate r.
Men enter the economy unemployed and single. In the labour market, they face a range of posted wages which are distributed according to an exogenous cumulative distribution function F (w) with support [w; w]. In order to capture productivity homogeneity, we assume that all men face exactly the same job prospects -here, the wage distribution F . Men use costless random sequential search to locate …rms and contact occurs at rate traits such beauty, height and weight -characteristics which are known to be important in marital matching. Single men look for potential marriage partners. In the marriage market, a man is viewed by all women as either attractive (type H) or less attractive (type L). A married man earning wage w enjoys ‡ow payo¤ w + y, where y > 0 captures the non-material utility of marriage. There is no divorce so marriage partnerships are for life.
Women are single when they enter the economy and they don't look for jobs. Let x denote the ‡ow payo¤ of a woman when single. We treat it as exogenous and it simply re ‡ects the utility di¤erence between being single and being married. 4 In turn, the di¤erence between x and y allows for possible asymmetries in the way women and men, respectively, value the bene…ts of marriage. 5 Women use costless random sequential search to locate single men. Let i w (with i = L; H) be the rate at which a woman meets such a man. A married woman's ‡ow payo¤ is equal to her partner's wage w plus a …xed ‡ow utility z i , where z H > z L . 6 The payo¤ z i captures the utility a woman gets from marrying a type i man. This is a crucial ingredient in our model and it captures two important considerations. First, it allows some participants in the marriage matching process (in this case, women) to have preferences about multi-dimensional features of potential marital partners. Secondly, it re ‡ects the perceived trade-o¤ between anthropometric characteristics and socio-economic status: all women regard a man's wage and his looks as substitute goods and therefore physical appearance, together with earnings determine whether or not a single man is accepted for marriage.
Anticipating the type of equilibria we are interested in, we assume for now that women do not marry unemployed men. Later, we show that this is a best response.
Given sequential search and the fact that utilities are increasing in wages, both men and women use optimal strategies characterised by the reservation value property. Denote these reservation values by R i and T i , respectively.
The case when men are marriageable even if they ignore the marriage market is uninteresting. Therefore, anticipating that R i > T i occurs under this scenario only, we omit it from the analysis.
Singles and couples alike leave the economy at an exogenous rate and we only consider steady states. Every time an unemployed man of type i accepts a job or leaves the economy, he is replaced by another type i unemployed. This means that the fraction of unemployed men of each type (u i ) can be treated as exogenous. Let N i denote the number of marriageable employed single men of type i and let i w be the rate at which a woman meets such an eligible bachelor. We assume a quadratic matching function with parameter that measures the e¢ ciency of the matching process. Then,
= N i . Similarly, assume a new single woman comes into the market every time a single woman gets married or exits the economy. This means that n can be regarded as exogenous and, with quadratic matching, we 3 Steady state and optimal search 3.1 Steady state:
The in ‡ow of unemployed men who …nd jobs with marriageable wages (above T i ), and the out ‡ow from the stock of marriageable men are equal when
Marriageable men of type i get married at rate n and die at rate , while unemployed men …nd marriageable wages at rate 0 [1 F (T i )]. From here,
In order to discuss the optimal behaviour of women and men, we also need the distribution of earned wages across marriageable employed men of type i. This is denoted by G i (w) and is obtained by combining (1) with a second steady-state equation:
This equates the ‡ow into employment of men who …nd jobs with marriageable wages (between T i and w), and the out ‡ow from the stock of men earning a wage between T i and w. From here, we get
Women:
Sequential search in the marriage market implies that the optimal strategy for women has the reservation value property. But, since wages and looks are substitutes, and since women regard men as either attractive or less attractive, they use a reservation wage strategy T i (z i ) in the marriage market, rejecting men of type i who earn wage w < T i (z i ).
The key observation is that since the ‡ow utility for a married woman is w + z i , women have a unique threshold reservation value that can be ful…lled di¤erently by the two types of men. In other words, even a less attractive man can get married as long as he earns enough (a wage higher than his attractive rival). Of course, whether he does that or not will depend on the wages he encounters and chooses to accept.
The expected value of being a single woman is denoted by W S (w). Recall that we only consider the case with T i R i . Standard derivations (and making use of (1))lead to the following Bellman equation:
In the above,
is the value of being married to an attractive or to a less attractive man, and it has the standard interpretation.
, we obtain
Proof. The proof is straightforward. By the de…nition of the reservation value, (r + )W
Please note that for R i T i , the expected value of being single is in fact independent of men's search strategy. This is essentially due to the fact that wages are exogenous. Firstly, men's search behaviour does not a¤ect the minimum wage in the exogenous distribution F (:). Secondly, men's search behaviour does not a¤ect the rate at which they …nd marriageable wages either. In turn, from (1) it is obvious that the measure of marriageable men N i is independent of R i .
Men:
Sequential search and the fact that utilities are increasing in wages imply that the optimal strategy has the reservation wage property. An unemployed man faces a wage distribution F (w) and, for any given reservation wage T which makes him acceptable for marriage, he uses a reservation wage function R(T ). As both L and H type men face the same wage distribution (and other relevant parameters), their reservation functions are identical:
Crucially however, the two optimal reservation wages R i will of course be di¤erent: they are simply the reservation function evaluated at the two reservation values chosen by women. That is,
In what follows, we fully characterise the function R(T ). First, let R be de…ned as the unique solution to
We will show later that R is the reservation wage that would obtain in a setting without a marriage market (i.e. when n = 0). We will also show that this is lowest reservation wage in any equilibrium.
Next, we look at the reservation wage function R(T ) when the marriage market does have an e¤ect (through T ) on the optimal job search.
De…ne b
T as the threshold wage for which R(T ) attains its maximum level. We will show that
Clearly, b T > R when both y > 0 and
Overall, a man (of either type) can be in one of three states: unemployed and single, employed at wage w and single (S), or employed at wage w and married (M ). For any T , denote his value of being unemployed by U , and let V S (w) describe the value of being single and earning a wage w.
Standard derivations lead to the Bellman equation for an unemployed man:
Anticipating that V S (w) is not a continuous function (see below), we can de…ne
Since there is no divorce, the value of being married and earning a wage w is V M (w) = w+y r+
. Hence, for any T , we have
Please note that when n = 0 (no marriage market), we have V S (w) = w r + for all w. Then, from U = V S (R), standard manipulation yields R = R. This is also the reservation wage that would be chosen by a hypothetical unemployed married man, since without divorce, the situation is as if there was no marriage market.
Next, we construct the reservation wage function and establish that it is non-monotonic.
Proposition 1 The reservation wage function R(T ) is continuous and:
(a) R < T and decreasing for T 2 ( b T ; w];
From the above,
T , the reservation function derived above does not survive as an optimal strategy. Also, unemployed men are not marriageable since a married unemployed would choose R(< T ).
(b) Any reservation wage R > T can easily be discarded. If men assume that their optimally chosen reservation wage is above T , they implicitly assume that they are not only marriageable once employed, but also while unemployed. However, in that scenario, their optimal reservation wage is R, which is less than T . This is clearly inconsistent.
Furthermore, we show below that R = T is preferred to R = R for R < T < b T . First, note that
Now consider R < T < b T . Unemployed men are still not marriageable. Intuitively, the only reason to increase R above R would be to become marriageable. But of course R = T is already enough for that. Indeed, for
T the optimal reservation wage was shown to be
ii) It is easy to show that for R < T < b T , U (R j R = T ) is continuous and increasing in T .
iii) U (R j R = T ) = U (R) for T = R.
At this point, it is also clear why women don't marry unemployed men. If they did, since there is no divorce, a man's reservation wage would drop to R. Consequently, marrying an unemployed is inconsistent with only accepting men earning w > T > R.
(c) Next, consider T R. If men believe they are marriageable irrespective of their employment status, they choose R = R both when single and married. This is because V S (w) = w r+
y for all w R. For T < R, they are indeed always marriageable.
Finally, consider the case with T > w. We have 1 F (T ) = 0, and therefore no man can ever get married (as the highest available wage is w). Men optimally set R(T ) = R since they behave as there was no marriage market.
The optimal reservation wage strategy of men is illustrated in Figure  1 . The diagram captures the fact that the best response function is nonmonotonic and attains its maximum value when T = b T , where
This non-monotonicity captures an interesting trade-o¤ faced by men for varying levels of T . When the marriage problem is not trivial, an increase in reservation wage has two e¤ects. On the one hand, in order to ensure marriageability the reservation wage must jump to match women's reservation value. On the other hand, any increase in the reservation wage comes at the cost of limiting your job prospects.
If the marriage threshold wage is relatively low (but above R), the cost described above is not too high, and hence men hold out for such a wage. This cost increases with T and there is a threshold value ( b T ) for which it is not compensated by the prospect of marriage once you are employed.
For b T < T < w, by being willing to accept a wage lower than the threshold required by women, a single man risks throwing away the prospect of marriage. The willingness to accept such a risk by setting R < T is purely because of search frictions and what one might call the "bird in hand e¤ect". Here, a job o¤er is deemed acceptable by a single man even if it precludes marriage: the wage may be slightly less than the (relatively high) threshold set by women, but it is still high enough not to risk holding out for an even higher o¤er. For even more demanding threshold values, the likelihood of encountering such high wages decreases further, and with it the reservation wage of men.
Please note that in both the above scenarios unemployed men cannot get married -as we assumed at the very beginning. To show this is true, consider what happens if women do marry unemployed men. Without divorce, a married unemployed man will choose R: he can safely ignore the marriage market as he will never go back to it. In other words, men cannot credibly commit to a high reservation wage. Such a promise becomes empty as soon as they tie the knot. With no divorce, women optimally choose to reject single unemployed men. Also, note that, as anticipated, R > T only occurs when T < R.
It is interesting to note that even for a very high (but …nite) y, as long as there are search frictions in the labour market, there will always be a range of T 's such that optimal R(T ) < T and
Intuitively, this is because in this economy, before they can think of marriage, single men need to …nd a job …rst. Unless men have a "lexicographic" preference for marriage, no matter how high the T is, the utility of marriage is never high enough to outweigh the cost of having limited job prospects.
Lemma 2 Given 0 < 1, for any y < 1, we have b R < w:
Proof. First, if there are no frictions in the labour market ( 0 ! 1), then R(T ) = w and hence the R < T region disappears. Second, recall that
T is a function of y. Then,
Then, lim b T !w y = 1 (since the limit of the numerator is a positive constant, while the limit of the denominator is zero). As b T is an invertible function, it follows that lim
Furthermore, since
As one would expect, the higher the non-material utility of a partnership, the smaller the range of T 's for which men accept wages that preclude marriage.
Equilibrium
Our main focus is on a search equilibrium characterised by beauty premium, where attractive men earn higher wages than less-attractive men. In the context of our model, this means that the H type men set a higher reservation wage than the L type men. Whether both types choose reservation wages that may jeopardise their marriage prospects also plays a key role.
From the above, it is apparent that in such an equilibrium the strategies that give rise to the phenomenon of beauty premium are also behind the so-called marriage wage premium, whereby married men earn higher wages than their single rivals. In this section we also explore in detail the intimate link between the two types of premia.
De…nition of search equilibrium:
A search equilibrium with R i T i is a system fG i (:); R i ; T i ; N i ; u i g satisfying the following:
(i) The distribution of wages earned by marriageable men of type i is
(ii) Men's reservation wage R i solves
(iii) Women's reservation value satis…es
with W S (w) as de…ned.
(iv) Steady state turnover conditions
and
Equilibrium with beauty premium and marriage premium
In a search equilibrium characterised by beauty premium, the reservation wage of H type men is higher than the reservation wage of the L type men: R H > R L . As a consequence, in this equilibrium the average wage of H men is also higher than the average wage of L men.
In a search equilibrium with marriage wage premium for type i men, the reservation wage of these men is lower than the reservation wage of women: R i < T i . This in turn means that the average wage of married type i men is higher than the average wage of single type i men. Also, note that the marriage wage premium for i type men increases with the di¤erence T i R i .
The following Theorem provides su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a search equilibrium with beauty premium, and also characterises the marriage wage premia for the two types of men.
Theorem 1 (a) There always exists a non-empty set of parameter values for which a search equilibrium with beauty premium exists. (b) The marriage premium of L type men is higher than that of H type men i¤ the marriage premium of L type men is positive. Proof. We have described women's reservation match strategy and have established that it is independent of R i . It is easy to show that @T i @x > 0. We have also fully characterised men's optimal reservation wage strategy R(T ) and have shown that it is continuous. Furthermore, by Lemma 2, R(T ) is non-monotonic in T .
Without loss of generality, assume that z L = 0 and z = z H (> 0). Let the combination (x; z) be such
the marriage premium of L types is higher than that of H types (which in turn is positive). Now consider a small decrease in z. From T L = T H + z = (r + )W S (w), it is easy to show that
Then, T L decreases, T H increases, and the resulting equilibrium has the same properties as before.
Secondly, consider a small decrease in x, so that T H becomes lower than b T (< T L ). Using similar continuity arguments, an equilibrium results in which R H = T H , so the marriage premium of H types is zero, and R L < T L , so the marriage premium of L types is positive. Once again, R H > R L . Alternatively, consider a small increase in z. Then, T L increases, T H decreases, and the resulting equilibrium outcome has the same characteristics as above. (please see at the end of paper) Theorem 1 is not exhaustive. Indeed, from Figure 1 above, it is easy to see that one can isolate di¤erent sets of su¢ cient conditions (in terms of x and z) for the existence of other types of equilibria. For example, if the combination of (x; z) is so high that T L > w and b T < T H < w, there is an equilibrium with a positive beauty premium in which the L type men never marry. On the other hand, if the combination of (x; z) is such that both T L and T H belong to (R; b T ), the equilibrium displays a negative beauty premium.
The following three results establish the subtle relationship between the two types of premia as it emerges from our analysis of the inter-linked frictional markets. T (but higher than R), we would have the following:
Corollary 2 A zero beauty premium exists only if the marriage premium for H type men is zero and the marriage premium for L type men is positive.
Proof. By contraposition. A zero marriage premium for H types requires R < T H < b T . If instead T H was higher than b T (but lower than w), then we would have R L < R H (since T L > T H ). Likewise, a positive premium for L type men requires b T < T L < w. If instead T L was lower than b T , we would have R L > R H (this follows from the proof of Corollary 1).
The results above show an interesting link between beauty premium and marriage wage premium. Following this, observed measures of the two types of premia provide a very strong falsi…cation test of the theoretical model.
An empirical test
In this section we carry out a strict falsi…cation test of our theory. By making clear the link between the two types of premia, the Theorem together with Corollaries 1 and 2 implicitly point to how one could potentially refute our model.
In particular, if we were to …nd a statistically signi…cant positive e¤ect of beauty on wages but no marriage wage premium across L type workers, our theory would not be appropriate in explaining the existence of beauty premium. By the same token, if we observed a zero beauty premium coupled with either a positive marriage premium for attractive men or a zero marriage premium for less attractive men, the model would be once again refuted.
With this in mind, our empirical investigation is structured as follows. In order to match the assumptions of the model, we need relevant proxies for beauty. To this end, we use measures of height and weight. Height is possibly better suited for our purposes as it is time-invariant, whereas weight isn't. 7 First, we look to …nd and measure the extent of beauty premium in our sample. Then, we check for the existence and pattern of marriage wage premium among di¤erent groups of men.
Our results show that when we use height as a measure of attractiveness, we …nd a positive beauty premium. Furthermore, both the beauty premium and the relevant marriage wage premium display a pattern consistent with that predicted by the Theorem and Corollary 1. A comparison across types con…rms that the marriage wage premium for less attractive (shorter) men is positive and the marriage premium for attractive (tall) men is lower.
On the other hand, when we use weight as a proxy for beauty, our results are consistent with Corollary 2. We observe a zero beauty premium together with a positive marriage premium for the less attractive (obese) men and a zero marriage premium for the attractive (not obese) men.
Data
We use data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) from Great Britain. The BHPS is a longitudinal panel survey that was …rst collected in 1991, with the last wave collected in 2008. 8 Initially the BHPS interviewed 5,000 households, providing around 10,000 interviews. The same individuals are interviewed each year, and if individuals split o¤ from their original household into a new household then the other members of the new household are also interviewed. The data is supplemented by extra samples covering geographical areas of Great Britain. The BHPS includes rich information on income and socio-economic status, making it ideal for estimating wage equations.
To classify individual physical attractiveness we use data on height and weight as measured by body mass index BMI (from waves 14 in 2004 and 16 in 2006). Only waves 14 and 16 collected data on both BMI and height, but we treat height as time invariant.
Hence, when classifying individuals by height we are able to use the height measurements for each individual in waves 14 and 16 and apply those heights to all waves in which the individuals appear, providing a much larger sample size. Heights and weights were measured in either metric or imperial units. However, for this paper all measures were converted to metric units.
For all the empirical models below the dependent variable is the log of hourly wages. While this variable does not occur within the BHPS it is possible to construct it using hours normally worked per month, and usual monthly take-home pay. We only include men in employment, removing those in self-employment or out of the labour force. Our focus is on men who are either married or have not yet married.
Initially, individuals are classi…ed as "not tall" if their height is 1.70 metres or less. The average height of our estimation sample is 1.78 metres, which is approximately average height for men in Great Britain. The bottom 10% is 1.70 metres tall or less. To check for robustness we alter the threshold height of "not tall" to include taller individuals and then repeat the empirical exercise.
For BMI again we split the sample into two groups: "obese" (BMI greater than or equal to 30) and "not obese" (BMI below 30). 9 For the sample in 2004 the average BMI was 26.51 and by 2006 it had increased to 26.8.
We focus on men aged between 20-50, where we believe the marriage premium will be most relevant, although we investigate the impact of using di¤erent age groups as well.
As other regressors we include controls for education, number of children, household size, self-reported health (potentially another source of productivity), a regional dummy, year dummies and a range of job speci…c factors such as: experience, part-time vs full-time dummy, a dummy identifying sector of employment, social class occupational classi…cation, number of employees, whether there is a union at the place of work, and markers of union status.
We only report results for the dummies related to marital status and anthropometric characteristics (height and weight). All other variables are included as controls and the results are available on request.
After the deletion of missing values on variables we are left with 1767 individuals (11,463 observations) for the height regressions and 1763 individuals (2498 observations) for the weight regressions.
Summary statistics
The summary statistics for the samples are given in Table 1 below:   TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE (please see at the end of paper)
Looking at our samples grouped by height and by BMI, one can identify distinct di¤erences in the characteristics of individuals. Table 2 below summarises this.   TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE (please see at the end of paper)
From the table we can see that the two attractive groups (the "tall" and the "not obese") are, on average, younger and more likely to report excellent health than individuals in the less attractive groups. The average height for the "tall" group is nearly 1.80 metres.
Tall individuals earn, on average, more than those who are not tall. On the other hand, the average wage for the obese and not obese are quite similar. However, the latter may be due to the fact that the obese are typically older than the not obese men.
There are interesting di¤erences in the proportion of married men. When comparing "tall" with "not-tall" the proportion of married men is quite similar at around 62% and 65%. However, there are larger di¤erences in the proportion of married men when they are categorised by weight: 53% of not obese men are married, compared to 68% of obese men. Again, this may be the e¤ect of age.
Empirical results for beauty premium
In what follows, we examine the wage di¤erentials observed in our data. Our results show a signi…cant and robust positive height premium. 10 On the other hand, the sign of the non-obesity premium depends on the speci…cation of our model. Having said that, in general it is found to be quite small in magnitude and not signi…cant. Given the afore-mentioned shortcomings of weight as a proxy for attractiveness, this is not surprising.
Using our sample (men aged 20-50) 11 we estimate models that are similar to the ones in Case et al. (2009) . Our dependent variable is the log of wages and on the right-hand side we include measures of height and weight, together with controls for age, region of residence, race, education and year dummies. For height we estimate pooled OLS models because height is time-invariant. For weight we estimate both pooled OLS and …xed e¤ect models. Robust standard errors, clustered on the individual, are estimated in each case.
The results are shown in Table 3 below:   TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE (please see at the end of paper)
Model 1 shows a clear and signi…cant height premium. 12 For weight we estimate three separate models. Model 2 …nds that increasing weight significantly increases wages, and therefore suggests a weight premium. However, once we use the augmented Model 3 that includes height as well as weight, the estimate on weight halves and becomes insigni…cant, while the height premium remains. Finally, Model 4 is estimated using …xed e¤ects and in this case the impact of increases in weight is negative, although not signi…cant.
Given that the coe¢ cient for height was found to be signi…cant, results consistent with Corollary 1 would have a positive observed marriage wage premium for the "not tall" group and a lower marriage wage premium (possibly zero) for the "tall" group. That is, a zero observed marriage premium for the shorter men would refute the theoretical model. Similarly, given the non-signi…cant e¤ect of weight on wages, if we then observe a positive premium for the "not obese" or a zero marriage premium for the "obese" men, that would contradict Corollary 2. We carry out these checks in the section below.
Empirical results for marriage premium
In order to estimate the marriage wage premium it is important to control for unobservable heterogeneity. Here, it is particularly important that we control for productivity. This is because productivity homogeneity is a crucial implicit assumption of our theoretical model. We control for productivity di¤erences by including education as a regressor and using …xed e¤ects estimation.
The basic regression equation is therefore:
where the dependent variable is the log of hourly wages, X it is a matrix of controls, i captures the individual's speci…c time-invariant heterogeneity, M it is an indicator of an individual's marital status and " it is the standard idiosyncratic error term. In this case the coe¢ cient of interest is as this provides the estimate of the marriage premium.
Estimating this regression using pooled OLS assumes that i is zero, especially in our case where there are no productivity di¤erences between individuals. It may be possible to control for potential productivity e¤ects by including measures of education in the matrix of controls X it . However, this may not completely ameliorate the problem of unobservable heterogeneity. Fixed e¤ects estimation involves a within-individual transformation of the data that sweeps out the …xed e¤ects and is the standard model for estimating marriage wage premium. 13 First, we estimate the OLS model that includes education dummies as extra regressors. Table 4 below presents the regression results.
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
(please see at the end of paper)
The pooled OLS results on height show that the estimated marriage premium is positive and larger for men classi…ed as "tall" than for "not tall" men. This would contradict the predictions of our model, but it may well be simply due to the fact that the OLS does not account for unobserved heterogeneity.
To overcome this problem, we estimate using …xed e¤ects. The estimates for marriage wage premium are again positive. However, this time the relationship is reversed. The coe¢ cient for the "tall" (above 1.70m) group is close to zero and insigni…cant, whereas the estimate for the "not tall" (less than 1.70m) group is positive, large and signi…cant. This result is in line with the Theorem (part b) and -given the positive height premium -with Corollary 1.
When we relax the threshold to 1.75m the estimated marriage premium for the "not tall" group is now positive (but lower), and almost signi…cant at the 10% level, whereas the corresponding estimate for the "tall" group is still close to zero (but higher) and insigni…cant. This again is in line with the predictions of the theoretical model. As some men -previously categorised as "tall"-move into the "not tall" group, their e¤ect is to decrease the marriage premium for this group.
Next, we turn our attention to the e¤ect of weight on wages. Once again, the pooled OLS yields a larger wage premium for the attractive ("not obese") group. As before, in order to overcome the shortcomings of OLS, we estimate a …xed e¤ects regression. We obtain a positive and signi…cant marriage wage premium for the not attractive ("obese") category and a non-signi…cant coe¢ cient for the attractive ("not obese") men. These results are again in line with the Theorem (part b) and -given the zero weight premium -with Corollary 2 as well.
In order to investigate whether the above results are sensitive to the de…ned age-groups we re-estimated the models for age-groups 20-60 and 20-40, with the …ndings reported in Table 5 below.   14   TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE (please see at the end of paper)
These results con…rm our earlier …ndings. Although there is some variation in the estimated marriage premium, the magnitude is always larger (and often signi…cant) for the unattractive group. For the attractive group the estimates are close to zero and not signi…cant. These estimates demonstrate that our earlier results are robust to changes in the age-groups.
Conclusion
We have constructed a theoretical search model that examines how marriage market expectations and behaviour a¤ect labour market outcomes (and vice versa). We have established the existence and analysed in detail a search equilibrium characterised by wage di¤erentials and the so-called "beauty premium".
Our results rely entirely on the frictional nature of the two markets and on the natural assumption that physical attraction is important for successful marriage partnership formation. More speci…cally, we assume that some participants in the marriage market (women) rank the members of the opposite sex (men) in the same way in terms of attractiveness. With women being selective about whom they marry (both in terms of looks and wages), men might struggle to …nd wages that are high enough to be deemed acceptable by females. If physical attributes and socio-economic status are perceived as substitutes by women, this e¤ect is stronger for less attractive men, and consequently their chosen reservation wage may be lower than that of their more attractive rivals. This leads to a gap between the average wages of the two types of men. Importantly, these results also allow us to conclude that male heterogeneity vis-a-vis the labour market is not necessary for the explanation of beauty premium as an equilibrium outcome.
We also show that the behaviour which leads to beauty premium lies at the heart of another phenomenon: the "marriage premium". We …nd a subtle link between the two types of premia. A positive beauty premium is only compatible with an outcome where the marriage premium for less attractive men is positive, and in turn higher than the one for attractive men. Conversely, a zero observed beauty premium is only possible if there is no marriage premium for attractive men and there is a positive marriage premium for less attractive men.
The predicted relationship between beauty premium and marriage wage premium provides a strong falsi…cation test of our theory. We carry out an empirical analysis and we conclude that the data does not refute the validity of the model. *, **, ***: 10%, 5% and 1% level of signi…cance The models all show the estimates attached to the 'Married' variable. All models include a full range of controls: age, health, number of kids, household size, job sector, size of employer, job part-time, experience, union membership, whether there is a union at place of work and experience. Clustered standard errors are presented in brackets. There were insu¢ cient observations to estimate the model on the 20-40 year old obese group.
